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FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY: THE NEED TO PREPARE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR
DELIBERATE RELEASE EXPERIMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, a technique for manipulating the genetic composition.
of bacteria was disclosed to the public.' During the ensuing fourteen
years, the development of the biotechnology' industry has made the
widespread use of genetically engineered' products imminent." The
federal government has responded to that growth by implementing
policies to ensure the safety of genetically engineered products. This
comment focuses on the regulation of the genetic engineering process
known as a deliberate release experiment. In a deliberate release ex-
periment, a genetically engineered microorganism is released into the
environment to evaluate its potential for accomplishing a particular
purpose. For example, genetically engineered bacteria may be used
to prevent frost damage to crops' and to eradicate harmful insects.'
The first deliberate release experiment was conducted in April
of 1987.' Before that, concerns about the safety of deliberate release
experiments had led a federal court to enjoin proposed experiments.'
0 1987 by Donald J. Pagel, Jr.
1. The disclosure was made by Herbert Boyer at the Gordon Conference on Nucleic
Acids. See Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty,
95 YALE L.J. 553 (1986) (describing the impact of the Boyer-Cohn technique).
2. Biotechnology is the application of biological systems and organisms to technical and
industrial processes. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,906 (1984).
3. Genetic engineering is a technology used to alter the hereditary apparatus of a living
cell so that the cell can produce more or different chemicals or perform completely new func-
tions. These altered cells are then used in industrial production. Id. See also infra notes 12-15
and accompanying text.
4. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that genetically engi-
neered organisms are patentable); Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1985, at 38, col. I (Monsanto Company
develops a genetic engineering technique to increase plant resistance to viruses); Abramson,
Genentech's Drug Problem, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 25, 1985, at 70 (Genentech projects $30-40
million first year sales for Protropin, a genetically engineered human growth hormone).
5. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
6. GENETIC ENGINEERING NEWS, July/Aug. 1985, at 1, col. I.
7. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
8. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984),
aff d in part, and vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
This comment examines the federal regulatory processes affecting
this area of the biotechnology industry. Section II analyzes relevant
regulations9 and two judicial decisions concerning deliberate release
experiments.' 0 Section III evaluates the adequacy of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's review process for approving deliberate
release experiments. Finally, Section IV proposes preparation of ini-
tial environmental impact statements" for all deliberate release
experiments.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GENETIC ENGINEERING
EXPERIMENTS
A. Technical Background
Many useful biological products such as drugs, hormones, en-
zymes and pesticides, are composed of a class of chemical compounds
know as proteins. Proteins are synthesized in nature inside of cells
by segments of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) called genes.' In a
typical genetic engineering experiment, a gene within a micro-
organism,'" which controls the production of a certain protein, is
modified.' 4 This gives the engineered microorganism the ability to
produce (or sometimes not produce) a different protein than the orig-
inal microorganism produces. The new gene is often referred to as
recombinant DNA (rDNA), a name also applied to the whole ge-
netic engineering process. 6
Throughout the development of rDNA processes, scientists have
been aware of both the enormous potential and the equally
9. These regulations are: (1) the National Institutes of Health (NIH) regulations,
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976)
[hereinafter Guidelines]; (2) the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982); (3) the Office of Science
and Technology Policy's Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed.
Reg. 23,302 (1986) [hereinafter Coordinated Framework].
10. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Foundation on Economic Trends v.
Thomas, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,632 (1986).
11. Environmental impact statements (EIS) are detailed studies of the effects a proposed
federal action will have on the quality of the human environment. Their preparation is man-
dated by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 39-45 for a
more complete discussion.
12. A. LEHNINGER, BIOCHEMISTRY 65 (1970).
13. A microorganism is an organism that is a fungus, prokaryote, protist or virus. 49
Fed. Reg. 50,906 (1984). Bacteria are microorganisms.
14. See R. OLD & S. PRIMROSE, PRINCIPLES OF GENE MANIPULATION 5-6 (3d ed.
1985). Animal cells (eukaryotic cells) can also be modified by genetic engineering techniques.
Id. at 12.
15. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 27,903-04.
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enormous danger of that technique."6 The danger is that alteration
of genetic material in microorganisms could create life forms with
unknown properties.' 7 Released into the environment, these new mi-
croorganisms could disrupt or destroy existing ecosystems. On the
other hand, when properly contained, the process has great humani-
tarian and commercial potential. For example, it allows previously
scarce materials, such as insulin, to be produced in large amounts.'
The great challenge for regulatory agencies is to insure that the
exploitation of this new found technology takes place safely. An ex-
planation of the regulatory background of this area and the method
of judicial review of administrative decision making is essential to
understanding the current status of this important technology.
B. Regulatory Background
1. Early Regulation
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) initiated federal
oversight of genetic engineering research in 1976 by issuing its
Guidelines for Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules (Guide-
lines).' Under the Guidelines, only carefully controlled laboratory
experiments involving rDNA were permitted. Deliberate release ex-
periments and five other types of rDNA experiments were prohib-
ited."0 The Guidelines, however, were directed only at institutions
receiving NIH funds and the only sanction for their violation was
loss of NIH funding2' The NIH had no direct control over institu-
tions or companies not receiving NIH funds, although most parties
conducting rDNA research complied voluntarily with the
Guidelines.22
In 1978, NIH revised the 1976 Guidelines.2" The 1978
16. See, e.g., THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING, RE-
PORT BY SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT TO HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY, 98TH CONG., 2d Sess. 9 (1984) [hereinafter Report].
17. For example, in one laboratory experiment, a fungus was genetically modified to
enhance the nitrogen fixing capability of pine trees. While the original fungus was harmless,
the recombinant fungus turned out to be pathogenic and one isolate killed the tree seedlings to
which it was applied. Id. at 19.
18. Comment, Biotechnology in the Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals: The Need for In-
ternational Regulation, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 675 (1984).
19. See Guidelines, supra note 9.
20. Guidelines, supra note 9, at 27,915.
21. McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36
VAND. L. REV. 461, 501 (1983).
22. Id. at 469 n.37.
23. Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 43 Fed. Reg.
19871
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Guidelines permitted much greater freedom in genetic engineering
research. Subsequently, NIH approved three deliberate release ex-
periments - none of which were ever conducted." '
The fact that the 1978 NIH Guidelines were only applicable to
NIH funded institutions and the accelerated pace of commercial bio-
technology activity, mandated that the scope of federal regulation be
expanded."
2. Current Regulation
The federal government now regulates all areas of biotechnol-
ogy activity including commercial applications. The comprehensive
policy statement describing the regulatory system of the biotechnol-
ogy industry (the "Coordinated Framework") became effective in
1986.26 Under the Coordinated Framework, six federal agencies
2 7
use their existing statutory authority to regulate various areas of bio-
technology research and industry. 8 This approach was chosen
because the existing health and safety laws provided an immediate
and familiar regulatory system for industry and because the broad
spectrum of genetically engineered products defies a unitary statu-
tory approach.29
Under the Coordinated Framework, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) became the lead agency in regulating the release
of genetically engineered microbial pesticides into the environment."0
The EPA is allocated this duty because the Federal Insecticide,
60,108 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Guidelines].
24. See Heckler, 756 F.2d at 150. These three experiments involved: (1) improving the
dietary value of corn plants containing rDNA; (2) the spread of pollen from tobacco and
tomato plants containing rDNA; and (3) increasing the frost resistance of potato, tomato and
bean plants. Id.
25. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,857 (1984). The 1978 Guidelines, in modified form, remain impor-
tant because they still govern research funded by NIH. See Coordinated Framework, supra
note 9, at 23,305.
26. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9.
27. These are: the United States Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health, the Na-
tional Science Foundation and Occupational Safety and Health Administration. See supra note
9, at 23,302.
28. This regulatory approach was first described in the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy's Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Proposal]. A table listing the agencies which regu-
late various biotechnology products is given in Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at
23,304.
29. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,303.
30. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,315.
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Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)1 and the Toxic Substance
Control Act (TSCA) 2 already provide, the EPA authority over con-
ventional microbial products. Because the scope of the EPA's
authority under FIFRA extends to the review and registration of
new conventional pesticides, the EPA asserts that it has control over
genetically engineered microbial pesticides." The TCSA gives the
EPA the authority to assess and control exposure to "chemical sub-
stances.", 4 Since DNA is a chemical substance, the EPA asserts that
TSCA also gives the Agency control over genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms used for certain nonpesticidal purposes. 3
The expansion of the EPA's existing FIFRA and TSCA au-
thority to cover genetically engineered microorganisms is interesting
in two respects. First, it raises the issue of whether this is a legiti-
mate expansion of statutory authority. In passing FIFRA and
TSCA, Congress never contemplated genetic engineering processes.36
Second, and most important for purposes of this comment, is
whether the policy announced in the Coordinated Framework is
consistent with the judicial scrutiny that has prevented previous de-
liberate release experiments. In this respect, it is necessary to con-
sider the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 7 and the manner in which the NEPA has been applied to
31. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1972).
32. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,324. The Toxic Substances Control
Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976).
33. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,319. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 50,881
(1984). Genetically engineered microbial pesticides (GEMPs) are microorganisms that have
been modified by genetic engineering techniques and are used as pesticides.
34. TSCA defines chemical substances to mean "any organic or inorganic substance of a
particular molecular identity including any combination of such substances occurring in whole
or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in nature. 15 U.S.C. §
2602(2)(A) (1976).
35. 1984 Proposal, supra note 28, at 50,886-87. For example, under TSCA, the EPA
would regulate genetically engineered microorganisms used for the conversion of biomass to
energy, the enhancement of oil recovery, the extraction of metals and for some agricultural
applications such as nitrogen fixation. Genetically engineered microorganisms used as or to
produce foods, foodstuffs, food additives, drugs, cosmetics or medical devices would be regu-
lated by the FDA or the USDA. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,324. See also
Schiffbauer, Regulating Genetically Engineered Microbial Products Under the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 ENVTL. L. REV. 10,279, 10,281 (1985) [hereinafter Schiffbauer].
36. The EPA acknowledges that the expansion of its statutory authority has been ques-
tioned by many commentators on the 1984 Proposal. However, the EPA maintains that
FIFRA and TSCA furnish adequate authority for the regulation of biotechnology products.
See Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,315. Contra Schiffbauer, supra note 35, at
10,288 (concluding that Congress did not expressly exclude genetically engineered products
from TSCA jurisdiction).
37. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982)).
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previously proposed deliberate release experiments.
3. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
NEPA was enacted to ensure that environmental concerns were
injected into the federal decision making process. 8 The major
"action-forcing" provision of NEPA is section 4332."' Specifically,
section 4332(C) requires that all agencies of the federal government
prepare a detailed statement discussing the environmental impact of
all "major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment .... ",40 That detailed statement is known as an
environmental impact statement (EIS).
Pursuant to section 4332, federal agencies must consider, as a
threshold matter, whether an EIS should be prepared. If the agency
decides against preparing an EIS, it must prepare an environmental
assessment"' providing the "evidence and analysis" for its negative
decision.' 2 If an EIS is to be prepared, the agency must decide what
information will be required in the document. The basic require-
ments of the EIS are set out in section 4332(C)(i)-(v) and can be
summarized as requiring the agency to consider both the impacts of
and alternatives to the action.'" Once the EIS is prepared, NEPA
imposes a duty on the agency to include the finding of the EIS in the
decision making process."
The courts have assumed an important role in policing NEPA's
38. R. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TATLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
LAW AND POLICY 683-86 (1984) [hereinafter ANDERSON].
39. See, e.g., Heckler, 756 F.2d at 146.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
41. "Environmental assessment: (a) Means a concise public document for which a Fed-
eral agency is responsible that serves to (1) Briefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for
determining whether to prepare an environmental statement or a finding of no significant im-
pact." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1986).
42. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b) (1986). See also ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 698.
43. Section 4332(C) states:
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human en-
vironment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which could
be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
44. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 753.
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requirements. A plaintiff wishing to challenge a proposed federal ac-
tion can raise three arguments in federal court. First, an NEPA
plaintiff can argue that an EIS needs to be prepared for the action.
Second, if an EIS was prepared, the plaintiff can argue that it is
inadequate. Third, the plaintiff can challenge the merits of the
agency's ultimate decision."5 Judicial review of NEPA issues is gen-
erally treated under the "substantial inquiry" test of Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe."" Under the substantial inquiry
test, a reviewing court will be less deferential to administrative
agency decisions than under the "arbitrary and capricious" test of
the Administrative Procedure Act.' The substantial inquiry test re-
quires that an agency at least adhere strictly to procedural require-
ments of NEPA, carefully explain its decision-making and not reach
plainly indefensible results.""
Deliberate release experiments have been blocked in the past by
challenging NIH's decision not to prepare an EIS for the experi-
ments. More recently, one court held that the EPA's approval of a
deliberate release experiment under the Coordinated Framework
was not subject to the strict requirements of NEPA."9 The case his-
tories of these challenges lays the foundation for evaluating future
regulation of deliberate release experiments.
C. Recent Case History
1. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler
The first attempted deliberate release experiment of a geneti-
cally engineered microbial pesticide was blocked in February of
1985. In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler,"0 the court of
appeals affirmed a temporary injunction prohibiting approval of the
experiment by NIH. In arguing the case, both sides"' agreed that
45. A challenge on the merits of an agency's decision is very difficult to win because the
EIS is only one factor in reaching an ultimate decision. To be successful, a challenge on the
merits must demonstrate that the ultimate decision was arbitrary in view of the EIS. See
ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 753.
46. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). The substantial inquiry test of Overton Park evolved into the
"hard look" doctrine of judicial review in subsequent environmental decisions. See ANDERSON,
supra note 38, at 101.
47. See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 101.
48. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 19 (1977).
49. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,632 (1986).
50. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
51. Appellants were Margaret Heckler, Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Regents of the University of California. Respondents were three
1987]
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NIH approval of a deliberate release experiment was a major
federal action within the meaning of NEPA.S Thus, the parties con-
ceded that the environmental review procedure mandated by NEPA
applied to the approval of this experiment." The disagreement in
Heckler arose over what constituted an adequate environmental as-
sessment for this experiment."' The court's concern was that NIH
only superficially considered the issue of dispersion " before deciding
not to prepare an EIS. Thus, the court upheld the injunction and
stated that until an adequate environmental assessment was
completed on the issue of dispersion, the question of whether an en-
vironmental impact statement should be prepared for deliberate re-
lease experiments remained open."
The problem of dispersion is an issue common to all deliberate
release experiments. After Heckler, it seemed reasonable to expect
that future federal approval of deliberate release experiments would
include an environmental assessment sufficient for either determining
whether to prepare an EIS or a finding of no significant impact.57
However, that was not the case. In December of 1985, acting under
its newly announced policy of regulating deliberate release experi-
ments under FIFRA, the EPA announced that it had approved a
new deliberate release experiment.58 In approving this experiment,
the Agency concluded that there would be no adverse effects on
humans or the environment, 9 but did not formally prepare an envi-
ronmental assessment. Subsequently, a district court upheld the
EPA's approval of the proposed experiment.6" This experiment was
conducted in the April of 1987.61
environmental groups and several individuals.
52. 756 F.2d at 153.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
54. See supra note 41 for a definition of environmental assessment.
55. Dispersion is the process by which genetically engineered microorganisms move
outside of the test area. Because of the novelty of deliberate release experiments, very little is
actually known about dispersion. Experience with more familiar organisms, however, like the
Gypsy Moth, has shown the serious consequences of inadequate containment measures. See
Report, supra note 16, at 5.
56. 756 F.2d at 154.
57. These are simply the requirements imposed by the definition of an environmental
assessment. See supra note 41.
58. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,760 (1985). The approval of this experiment marked the shift of
regulatory authority over deliberate release experiments from NIH to EPA. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-35.
59. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,762 (1985).
60. See Thomas, 16 ENv-rL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,632 (1986).
61. See San Jose Mercury News, April 25, 1987, at IA, col.I. Within a week of this
first deliberate release experiment, a second experiment was conducted by the University of
[Vol. 27
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2. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas
In the April 1987 deliberate release experiment, Advanced
Genetic Sciences (AGS), a commercial biotechnology company
sprayed a 0.1 acre strawberry patch in California with an aqueous
solution of bacteria. These bacteria had been genetically altered to
prevent the secretion of an ice-nucleating protein.62 The purpose of
this procedure is to control frost damage to the strawberry plants by
replacing the bacteria that secrete the ice-nucleating protein with
genetically engineered bacteria that do not secrete the protein.63
This experiment is basically the same experiment that was
enjoined in the Heckler case discussed above."" In light of the simi-
larity to Heckler, the question arises as to why the AGS experiment
was approved. In Heckler, the injunction was issued because NIH
had not complied with the procedural requirements of NEPA." In
the AGS case, approval of the experiment was given by the EPA
under the auspices of FIFRA.6" Apparently, the EPA believed that
the procedures adopted under the Coordinated Framework for re-
viewing proposed deliberate release experiments either obviated for-
mal compliance with the NEPA standards articulated in Heckler, or
that the Coordinated Framework procedures are the equivalent to
NEPA compliance.
The latter position was adopted in Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Thomas,7 where the District of Columbia District Court
held that a preliminary injunction should not be issued to enjoin the
AGS experiment. The court found that plaintiffs had not sufficiently
shown they would succeed on the merits in proving the EPA violated
provisions of NEPA, FIFRA and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Furthermore, there was no showing of irreparable injury to
plaintiffs because the parties stipulated that the deliberate release ex-
periments were not imminent.68 In reaching this decision, the court
applied a two-step judicial review procedure to the EPA's process for
approving the AGS deliberate experiment. First, the court reviewed
California. See San Jose Mercury News, April 30, 1987, at 8B, col. 1.
62. 50 Fed. Reg. 49,760 (1985).
63. Id. See also San Jose Mercury News, Nov. 5, 1985, at 3E, col. 1.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55. In the Heckler experiment, non-ice-nu-
cleating bacteria were to be applied to plots of potatoes, tomatoes and beans. 756 F.2d at 150.
Interestingly, Advanced Genetic Sciences financed the University of California experiment en-
joined in Heckler. See San Jose Mercury News, Oct. 30, 1985, at 6A, col. 5.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
66. See supra note 58.
67. Thomas, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,632 (1986).
68. Id. at 20,633.
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the procedural requirements for issuing an experimental use
permit. 9 Second, the court deferred to the EPA on plaintiffs' sub-
stantive challenges7 to issuance of the experimental use permit, not-
ing that in light of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review,
plaintiffs were not entitled to injunctive relief.71 The court then
noted that plaintiffs' case was further weakened because the strin-
gent substantive and procedural NEPA standards did not apply to
the EPA's approval of the AGS experiment. The EPA's review pol-
icy, as stated in the Coordinated Framework, was found to be the
"functional equivalent" to NEPA compliance.7
In applying the doctrine of functional equivalence to the EPA's
Coordinated Framework review procedure, the court has established
the legal standard which governs the development of deliberate re-
lease experiments in the immediate future. If the court's decision in
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas stands, it is likely that
many more deliberate release experiments will be approved by the
EPA under the Coordinated Framework. The next section of this
comment analyzes the procedural requirements of the Coordinated
Framework and discusses the propriety of classifying the Coordi-
nated Framework review as the functional equivalent to NEPA.
III. REGULATION OF DELIBERATE RELEASE EXPERIMENTS
UNDER THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK
A. Obtaining FIFRA Registration
Under the Coordinated Framework, 3 genetically engineered
69. An experimental use permit is a permit issued by the EPA under FIFRA which
allows the permit holder to test a pesticide on a small field. See infra text accompanying notes
75-92 for a discussion of experimental use permits.
70. Plaintiffs alleged that the EPA had not adequately considered the pathogenicity and
toxicity of the genetically engineered bacteria or the likelihood of dispersion or the effects
dispersion might have on atmospheric precipitation patterns as required by FIFRA and
NEPA. Thomas, 16 ENVT.. L. REP. (ENVr.. L. INST.) at 20,633 (1986).
71. Id. The arbitrary and capricious standard is mandated by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
72. Thomas, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) at 20,633 (1986). The functional
equivalence doctrine was first applied to FIFRA procedures in Environmental Defense Fund
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The basis for this
doctrine is that where the EPA's actions already occur within a substantive regulatory frame-
work that emphasizes the quality of man's environment, and a procedural framework that
provides an opportunity for thorough consideration of environmental issues and for judicial
review, then strict compliance with NEPA would be redundant. Id.
73. As discussed, supra text accompanying notes 26-35, the Coordinated Framework is
the Office of Science and Technology Policy's comprehensive policy for regulating the biotech-
nology industry. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 9.
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microbial pesticides (GEMPs) are regulated under FIFRA and must
be registered with the EPA Administrator prior to sale or distribu-
tion."' In order to register a pesticide, a manufacturer must collect
specific supporting data and information and submit it for EPA
review prior to registration. 5 Under FIFRA, manufacturers who
are required to collect information necessary for pesticide registration
may apply to the EPA for an experimental use permit. 6 The appli-
cation must contain certain preliminary data about the pesticide."
With respect to conventional pesticides, the EPA has a policy of
waiving the requirement of obtaining an experimental use permit.78
However, under the Coordinated Framework, manufacturers desir-
ing to conduct small-scale field studies 9 with GEMPs prior to
FIFRA registration, must first notify the EPA of this intention.8"
The EPA will then conduct an abbreviated review process to decide
if an experimental use permit will be required.
The EPA has determined that certain types of genetically
engineered microorganisms are more likely to cause adverse environ-
mental effects than others. Under the Coordinated Framework, the
EPA gives special regulatory attention to genetically engineered mi-
croorganisms that are likely to display new traits.8" Specifically, the
EPA has determined that inter-generic GEMPs,82 as opposed to in-
tra-generic GEMPs,83 are most likely to display new traits and
hence merit special attention. In order to account for the inter-
generic/intra-generic distinction and to minimize the regulatory bur-
74. 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1978).
75. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,319. The regulations governing the
specific types of data information required for registration are detailed in 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.65,
158.170 & 162.163 (1986).
76. See 7 U.S.C. § 136c(a) (1978).
77. 40 C.F.R. Part 158 (1985) specifies the data required to be submitted before the
EPA will issue an experimental use permit.
78. See 1984 Proposal, supra note 28, at 50,885. This waiver is allowed provided that
the pesticide is only being tested to evaluate its potential as a pesticide and that the testing is
conducted on a terrestrial field of less than 10 acres. Id.
79. Small-scale field studies are terrestrial field studies involving 10 acres or less of land
or aquatic field studies involving one surface acre or less of water. Coordinated Framework,
supra note 9, at 23,320.
80. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,320.
81. Id. at 23,317.
82. An inter-generic GEMP is a genetically engineered microbial pesticide in which the
new microorganism (GEMP) is formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material from
organisms of different genera. See id. at 23,307, 23,332.
83. An intra-generic GEMP is a genetically engineered microbial pesticide in which the
new microorganism is formed by the deliberate combination of genetic material from
organisms of the same genus. Id. at 23,317.
1987]
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den on GEMP producers in complying with the review process, the
EPA has implemented a two-level review system for determining if
an experimental use permit must be obtained.
Under the two-level system, Level II reporting requires that
more extensive information be supplied to the EPA than Level I
reporting. 84 The more rigorous Level II reporting applies to small-
scale field testing which involves inter-generic GEMPs or GEMPs
derived from source organisms that are pathogenic.85 Contemplated
small-scale field testing involving GEMPs which is not covered by
Level II notification (i.e., intra-generic GEMPs) are subject to the
less rigorous Level I reporting process. 86 Once the GEMP producer
provides the EPA with the information required under Level I or
Level II notification, the EPA has 30 or 90 days respectively, to
notify the applicant of the need to prepare an experimental use per-
mit.87 If a Level I applicant does not receive notice to prepare an
experimental use permit within the 30 day period, he is free to pro-
ceed with the small-scale field test. Level II applicants, however,
must await receipt of a decision document before proceeding with the
experiment.88
If either a Level II or a Level I applicant is required to prepare
an experimental use permit, the additional data and information89
necessary to support the permit application must be provided to the
EPA.90 The EPA then has 120 days to review the use permit appli-
cation and determine whether to grant a permit."1 If an experimental
use permit is issued, the applicant may proceed with the small-scale
field test. Thus, an applicant is entitled to proceed with the deliber-
ate release experiment if the use permit requirement is waived or an
experimental use permit is granted. The data generated during the
small-scale field test is subject to further review by the EPA before
84. See id. at 23,321-22.
85. A pathogen is a virus or microorganism that has the ability to cause disease in other
living organisms. See id. at 23,307, 23,333.
86. Id. at 23,321. The EPA has also determined that inter-generic GEMPs in which
the added genetic material consists only of well-characterized, non-coding regulatory regions,
are subject to Level I reporting. Id. at 23,317.
87. Id. at 23,321-23.
88. Id. at 23,323.
89. See supra note 77.
90. As an alternative to applying for an experimental use permit, a Level I applicant
can comply with the Level II reporting requirements. The additional information will be con-
sidered by the EPA in deciding if an experimental use permit is required; Coordinated Frame-
work, supra note 9, at 23,321.
91. 40 C.F.R. § 172 (1986). See also Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,323.
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the GEMP in question is granted FIFRA registration." For
purposes of this comment, the issue of whether or not a GEMP is
ultimately registered is irrelevant. This comment focuses on whether
the review process for approval of the small-scale field test prior to
registration should be subject to the NEPA standards.
B. Application of the Doctrine of Functional Equivalence in
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas
The preceding summary of the EPA's policy for regulating
deliberate release experiments demonstrates that the EPA has at
least made a good faith attempt to formulate a comprehensive ap-
proach to that complex area. In spite of this apparently rational ap-
proach to regulating deliberate release experiments, however, the
question remains as to the wisdom and legality of allowing a major
new technology, to slip into routine regulation by a federal agency
without being subjected to the full scrutiny of NEPA.93 After all, it
is one of the express purposes of NEPA to insure that full and ade-
quate consideration is given to all major federal actions significantly
affecting the environment.94 Compounding this apparent anomaly is
the fact that the EPA had to stretch its statutory authority to bring
genetic engineering processes under the ambit of FIFRA.
9 5
The court in Thomas addressed the new technology aspect of
deliberate release experiments by noting that the court is "at its most
deferential" when reviewing administrative decisions concerning
frontier technology." Curiously, in taking this approach, the court
ignored the issue of the EPA's questionable authority to regulate
deliberate release experiments." Even more curious was the cursory
manner in which the court found the EPA's approval of the AGS
deliberate release experiment to be the functional equivalent to
92. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,323-24.
93. By this, it is not implied that all GEMPs are dangerous. However, the possibility
exists that a genetically engineered microorganism could spread in an environmental niche
with unexpected results. In considering the first applications for deliberate release experiment
use permits, the EPA has already experienced regulatory problems. After initially approving
AGS's experimental use permit, the EPA was forced to temporarily suspend the permit when
it was learned that AGS conducted unauthorized experiments. See Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1986,
at 8, col. 2; San Jose Mercury News, March 23, 1986, at 20A, col. 1.
94. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 20,633 (citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983)).
97. Both case law and the Administrative Procedure Act require that a reviewing court
determine the scope of an agency's authority. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1982).
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NEPA compliance. The court repeatedly recited that functional
equivalence will be found where the five core NEPA issues9" are
carefully considered.99 In Thomas, the court apparently found that
the experimental use permit review procedure satisfies the five core
issues and is the equivalent of EIS preparation. This approach com-
pletely begs the question of whether experimental use permit review
is in fact the functional equivalent to EIS preparation. In order to
determine if the EPA's decision to issue a use permit was arbitrary,
capricious or an abuse of discretion, the court must also determine,
at a minimum, if the underlying procedural framework is arbitrary
and capricious. With the Coordinated Framework, where EPA has
formulated an entirely new regulatory framework, the court should
adopt a "hard look" approach to the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 00
Examination of the Coordinated Framework reveals that the
EPA has formulated its biotechnology regulatory policy around the
increased risks inherent in genetically engineered microorganisms.'
This formulation is the basis of the inter-generic/pathogenic classifi-
cation scheme discussed in section III (A) above.'02 The issue that
demands judicial review is whether or not the inter-generic/patho-
genic scheme evinces the concern for the environment demanded by
NEPA. In this respect, there are significant questions about the
EPA's risk assessment' procedures. First, the EPA's basic premise
concerning deliberate release experiments is new, untested and
98. The five core NEPA issues are: (I) the environmental impact of the action; (2)
possible adverse environmental effects; (3) possible alternatives; (4) the relationship between
short term use of the environment and long-term productivity; and (5) any irreversible commi-
tants of resources. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i-v)
(1982).
99. 489 F.2d at 1256; see also Environmental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650,
661 (D.D.C. 1978).
100. The "hard look" metaphor is often used to characterize the process of substantive
judicial review of agency rule making under the Administrative Procedure Act. See McGarity,
Beyond the Hard Look: A New Standard for Judicial Review?, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
32 (1986) [hereinafter McGarity]. The judicial basis for the hard look doctrine is found in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See ANDERSON, supra note
38, at 103. Recently, in Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983), the Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to expand the arbitrary and
capricious substantive judicial review function. See McGarity, supra, at 33-34.
101. For example, the EPA states: "The alternative [risk potential] that EPA has cho-
sen gives particular attention, under both FIFRA and TSCA, to microorganisms that (1) are
used in the environment, (2) are pathogenic or contain genetic materials from pathogens or (3)
contain new combinations of traits." Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,315.
102. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
103. Risk assessment refers to the process of identifying risks. See ANDERSON, supra
note 38, at 451-58.
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incomplete. The EPA recognizes that potentially significant risks are
caused by the absence of physical restraints in deliberate release ex-
periments."" However, the Agency's current position is that some
deliberate release experiments are safe because of biological re-
straints.1 0 5 Thus, during the two-level FIFRA review procedure,10 6
the EPA examines data provided by the GEMP manufacturer and
determines if the proposed release of the GEMP will be adequately
controlled by biological constraints. Remarkably, the EPA admits
that it has issued experimental use permits without finalizing the
guidelines used to evaluate testing methodology and risk assess-
ment.10 7 Secondly, many scientists doubt that adequate risk assess-
ment techniques are presently available for evaluating the safety of
deliberate release experiments."' Finally, the EPA's inter-generic/
pathogenic classification scheme is barely two years old and is notice-
ably slanted toward allowing deliberate release experiments.1 9
In view of these factors: the absence of an explicit Congressional
mandate, the novelty of the technology, the possibility of catastrophic
consequences, the absence of a scientific consensus on risk assessment
methodologies and the relative infancy of the EPA's policy for
regulating deliberate release experiments, it is irresponsible to waive
compliance with NEPA procedures as summarily as the Thomas
court did. The more responsible approach, as discussed in section IV
below, would be to require preparation of an EIS for each proposed
deliberate release experiment that the EPA reviews. Such an
104. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,316.
105. Biological constraints are natural or environmental factors which limit the growth
and survival of genetically engineered microorganisms, thus preventing their spread. Id.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 81-92.
107. These guidelines are the Pesticide Assessment Guidelines Subdivision M - Biora-
tional Pesticides, EPA No. 540/9-82-028 (Oct. 1982). See Coordinated Framework, supra
note 9, at 23,320.
108. See More Research on rDNA Risk Assessment Called for by Speakers at NAS
Conference, 8 CHEM. REG. REP. 1412 (BNA) (March, 1985); Note, The EPA and Biotech-
nology Regulation: Coping with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 YALE L.J. 553, 566 (1986) (ad-
vancing the proposition that the EPA has consciously made the decision to allow deliberate
release experiments despite the inadequate risk assessment methodologies).
109. The inter-generic/pathogenic classification scheme was implemented after publica-
tion of the 1984 Proposal, supra note 28, in response to comments received by the EPA
expressing concern about the EPA's original process for evaluating risk. See Coordinated
Framework, supra note 9, at 23,315. The EPA's express purpose in implementing a two-level
review procedure is "[slo that producers of microbial pesticides may proceed with their small
scale field tests without Agency approval." Id. at 23,321. One possible explanation for the
apparent push towards allowing deliberate release experiments is the intense competition from
Japan in the field of biotechnology. See San Jose Mercury News, March 9, 1987, at 13D, col.
1.
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approach might be overly cautious, however, it would insure that
deliberate release experiments will be properly documented before
routine commercial development of this powerful technology is
allowed.
IV. CONTROLLING DELIBERATE RELEASE EXPERIMENTS
A. An EIS Should be Prepared for Individual Deliberate Release
Experiments
The two most serious questions concerning deliberate release
experiments are whether genetically engineered microbial pesticides
(GEMPs) can be contained within a test site and whether the conse-
quences of containment failure can be predicted. In the absence of
Congressional action, any administrative pronouncements on these
issues will be met with skepticism and repeated judicial chal-
lenges.11 Accordingly, a public record directly addressing the issues
of containment and the consequences of containment failure is neces-
sary. The preparation of an environmental impact statement
(EIS)... for all initially approved deliberate release experiments
would satisfy this need. First, the preparation of an EIS would cre-
ate a public record, in language as plain as possible," 2 addressing all
of the environmental factors associated with a particular deliberate
release experiment. Second, the large body of NEPA case law would
provide a reference system which courts could use to orient
themselves in addressing the novel aspects of genetic engineering
technologies.' Third, and most importantly, preparation of an EIS
would force the EPA to crystallize its position concerning risk assess-
ment' in each experiment. If, over time, the EPA demonstrated that
its risk assessment methodologies were applicable to classes of exper-
iments (such as intra-generic, inter-generic and pathogenic
GEMPs), then perhaps applications to conduct deliberate release ex-
periments could be routinely reviewed in the manner that the EPA
110. See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 11, 1987, at 20A, col. 1-2 (EPA's ap-
proval of AGS experiment draws protests from environmentalists).
111. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of EISs.
112. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.8 (1986) states: "Environmental impact statements shall be writ-
ten in plain language . . . so that decision makers and the public can readily understand
them." d.
113. The courts have already seized on this reference point. The court in Thomas stated
that because the case law on experimental use permit review was sparse, it would utilize a
review procedure comparable to that used in EIS review. Thomas, 16 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) at 20,633 (1986).
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proposes in the Coordinated Framework." 4
The Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ).. 5 regulation
for incomplete or unavailable information"'0 would trigger a detailed
discussion of risk assessment in an EIS for a deliberate release ex-
periment. This regulation is ideally suited for dealing with the issues
that have caused concern about the safety of deliberate release exper-
iments. The stated goals of the regulation are: "[d]isclosure of the
fact of incomplete or unavailable information; acquisition of that
information if reasonably possible; and evaluation of reasonably fore-
seeable significant adverse impacts even in the absence of all
information." '1 7 Compliance with this regulation means that any un-
certainty (unavailable information) concerning the issue of dispersion
would have to be disclosed and an evaluation of the consequences of
dispersion would have to be discussed in the EIS for a particular
deliberate release experiment. The discussion of the consequences of
dispersion would then have to be considered by the EPA before
reaching a final decision on approval of a particular experiment. If a
private party still wished to challenge the EPA's treatment of these
issues, the adequacy of the EIS could be challenged before the delib-
erate release experiment was conducted."'
The exact content of an EIS adequately addressing issues of
incomplete or unavailable information is not well defined." 9 How-
ever, the regulation, and CEQ commentary on the regulation,
indicate the contours of what is expected. Initially, if an agency pre-
114. See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text.
115. The CEQ is an executive agency which issues regulations covering NEPA. This
includes regulations governing the preparation of EISs. See ANDERSON, supra note 38, at 687.
116. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986). In this regulation, the term "incomplete information"
refers to information which is unobtainable because of exorbitant costs. "Unavailable informa-
tion" refers to information which cannot be obtained because there is no known method for
obtaining it.
117. Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 15,620.
118. A challenge to the adequacy of the EIS would be reviewed under the "substantial
inquiry" standard. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. This review would be sig-
nificantly different from the review in Thomas because in Thomas, the court was concerned
with verifying compliance with FIFRA not NEPA. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying
text. Also, in Thomas the court deferred to the EPA's FIFRA procedures. In an EIS review,
the court would be free to evaluate the risk assessment data supplied to satisfy 40 C.F.R. §
1502.22 (1986).
119. This is because the relevant CEQ regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986), was
recently subject to extensive revision. The "old" section 1502.22 regulation required prepara-
tion of a worst case analysis for incomplete or unavailable information. For a discussion of the
"old" regulation, see Note, Scientific Uncertainty and the National Environmental Policy Act
- The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulation, 40 C.F.R. Section 1502.22, 60
WASH. L. REV. 101 (1984).
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paring an EIS encounters incomplete information relevant to reason-
ably foreseeable significant adverse impacts on the environment, and
the incomplete information is essential to a reasoned choice among
alternatives, the agency must obtain the information if the costs of
obtaining it are not exorbitant. 2° Secondly, if the relevant incom-
plete information cannot be obtained then the EIS must include a
statement discussing each of the following points: 1) the fact that
such information is incomplete or unavailable; 2) the relevance of the
incomplete or unavailable information to the task of evaluating rea-
sonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts; 3) a summary of ex-
isting scientific evidence concerning reasonably foreseeable adverse
environmental impacts; and 4) the agency's evaluation of the poten-
tial impacts based on sound scientific research methods."'
With respect to deliberate release experiments, this regulation
would compel the EPA to either develop a testing protocol which
provides answers to all relevant dispersion questions, or to document
the scientific reasoning which justifies allowing the deliberate release
120. The complete 40 C.F.R. section 1502.22 reads:
When an agency is evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects
on the human environment in an environmental impact statement and there is
incomplete or unavailable information, the agency shall always make clear that
such information is lacking.
(a) If the incomplete information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse impacts is essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives and the
overall costs of obtaining it are not exorbitant, the agency shall include the in-
formation in the environmental impact statement.
(b) If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse im-
pacts cannot be obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant
or the means to obtain it are not known, the agency shall include within the
environmental impact statement: (1) A statement that such information is in-
complete or unavailable; (2) a statement of the relevance of the incomplete or
unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse
impacts on the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credible scientific
evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse impacts on the human environment; and (4) the agency's evaluation of
such impacts based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally
accepted in the scientific community. For the purposes of this section, "reasona-
bly foreseeable" includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if
their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of impacts is
supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is
within the rule of reason.
(c) The amended regulation will be applicable to all environmental impact
statements for which a Notice of Intent (40 C.F.R. 1508.22) is published in the
Federal Register on or after May 27, 1986. For environmental impact state-
ments in progress, agencies may choose to comply with the requirements of ei-
ther the original or amended regulation.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986).
121. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1986), supra note 121.
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experiment to proceed in spite of incomplete or unavailable disper-
sion information. The issue of dispersion must not be dismissed
solely because the likelihood of its occurrence is remote. The regula-
tion specifically states that low probability/catastrophic impact
events are included within the definition of reasonably foreseeable
impacts.' 22 Furthermore, CEQ commentary specifies that the re-
quirement to disclose scientific evidence concerning reasonably fore-
seeable adverse impacts extends to responsible opposing views sup-
ported by generally accepted research methods."'
Under the Coordinated Framework, the EPA has developed a
regulatory scheme which classifies genetically engineered micro-
organisms as being inter-generic, pathogenic or intra-generic
microorganisms."' The EPA then evaluates proposed deliberate re-
lease experiments involving these classes of microorganisms accord-
ing to different, newly promulgated, FIFRA regulation."' Implicit
in this regulatory scheme are many assumptions about the traits that
newly created life forms will display, about the possibility of disper-
sion and about the ability of genetically engineered microorganism to
cause adverse effects on the environment."' All of these assumptions
should be considered incomplete or unavailable information and
should be addressed in an EIS pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section
1502.22. While preparing an adequate EIS on these issues would
take some time and effort, that is precisely the duty that NEPA,
through the CEQ regulations, imposes on federal agencies. It is
inconceivable that an administrator could make an informed decision
about a technological process like genetic engineering without thor-
oughly considering the effects of releasing genetically altered bacteria
into the environment.
Finally, it is important to note that delaying deliberate release
experiments until an adequate EIS is prepared does not mean that
the genetic engineering industry must be shut down. Many of the
122. Impacts not supported by credible scientific evidence do not have to be discussed in
the EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b)(4) (1986). However, the EPA recognizes that dispersion is a
credible potential impact. See Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,317. The regula-
tion incorporates the "rule of reason" test for determining what type of impacts must be ana-
lyzed in the EIS. See 51 Fed. Reg. 15,621. The rule of reason means that an EIS need not
analyze unforeseeable impacts, but impacts requiring some degree of forecasting cannot be
ignored. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 15,621.
123. 51 Fed Reg. 15,621.
124. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., Coordinated Framework, supra note 9, at 23,317.
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commercially important genetic engineering processes do not involve
release of microorganisms into the environment. Rather, with these
processes, the genetically engineered microorganisms are contained in
the laboratory and the chemical products which the microorganisms
produce are extracted before use.12
V. CONCLUSION
Genetic engineering processes have the potential to greatly
improve the quality of life. The power of genetic engineering tech-
niques, however, demands that development in this field proceed
with extreme caution.
In the past, rDNA research was loosely regulated by the NIH.
The early NIH guidelines, however, suffered from many problems
such as not being applicable to industrial researchers.' 2  The new
EPA regulations are a great improvement over the NIH guidelines.
However, the new regulations fail to adequately consider the unique
dangers of genetic engineering processes, such as dispersion. 2 9
A more rational approach to regulating the biotechnology
industry during its current rapid growth phase is to incorporate the
established safeguards of NEPA into the current regulatory frame-
work. This means that environmental impact statements should be
prepared for deliberate release experiments before they are
approved. The preparation of a statement discussing incomplete or
unavailable information associated with a particular deliberate re-
lease experiment, in conjunction with the environmental impact
statement, would ensure that the potential benefits of deliberate re-
lease experiments are adequately weighed against the possible cata-
strophic consequences associated with this new technology.
Donald J. Pagel, Jr.
127. See id. at 23,324.
128. See supra text accompanying note 22.
129. See supra note 55.
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